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The Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility Nexus in the 
Lebanese Banking Industry 
         
 
 
Purpose: This research seeks to explore the contrasting views of banks and banking authorities in 
Lebanon regarding the corporate governance and corporate social responsibility nexus.  
 
Design/Methodology/Approach: Using survey responses collected from managers of five 
Lebanese banks and banking authorities, we conduct a qualitative comparative study of the 
opinions on CG, CSR and CG-CSR nexus.  
 
Findings: Our findings reveal that while a CG culture is well-instituted by the authorities and that 
some forms of CSR are already practiced by banks, disagreements exist between the Lebanese 
banks and banking authorities in defining the CG-CSR nexus. While CG is viewed as an all-
encompassing concept by the banking authorities, most banks ascribe to the paradigm that CG is 
component of CSR. 
 
Research Limitations/Implications: Our sample consists of large banks that have clear CG and 
CSR agendas. Our results therefore cannot be generalized for the wider population of Lebanese 
companies that are characterized by family ownership and the non-separation of ownership and 
control. 
 
Practical Implications: This study informs both managers and policy-makers on the differing 
views of the CSR-CG nexus while also contributing to informing the policy dialogue. 
Theoretically, our study sheds light on the CG-CSR nexus in a developing country context. 
 
Originality/Value: There is a paucity of research on the CG-CSR nexus in the context of 
developing countries and in the banking sector in specific. This paper aims to address the gap in 
the literature by providing an in-depth qualitative examination of the CG, CSR and the CG-CSR 
nexus in the context of the Lebanese banking sector.  
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Corporate Social Responsibility, Bank managers, Banking 
authorities, Developing Countries. 
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1. Introduction  
The successive accounting scandals and corporate failures of the early 2000s as well as the 2008 
subprime mortgage crisis have led to a resurgence of interest in improving corporate governance 
(CG) practices in the U.S. and the world.1 The renewed interest in CG has been accompanied by 
an increasing awareness of the social and environmental consequences of corporate activities. 
The resulting drive towards Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has galvanized global 
attention and achieved significant resonance in recent years.  
 The growing importance of both CG and CSR has also led to intense academic scrutiny of the 
CG-CSR nexus. Evidently, the relationship between CG and CSR critically hinges on the 
definition of CG. With the separation of ownership and control in modern corporations, CG was 
initially viewed by financial economists as the mechanism through which the rights of external 
investors are protected (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). However, broader definitions of CG have 
been advanced. For instance, the Cadbury (1992) committee offers a more expansive definition 
of CG as the mechanism though which companies are managed and controlled. More recent 
views on CG also note that the consequences of corporate actions are not confined to internal 
claimholders but also affect external stakeholders, the environment, society and the economy. 
The latter view is consistent with the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD)’s principles on good CG which clearly refer to the effect of corporate actions on a wider 
group of stakeholders (OECD, 2004). Claessens (2003) and Claessens and Yirtoglu (2012) adopt 
this all-encompassing view of CG and further argue that CSR constitutes an integral component 
of good CG. 
 In light of the increasing importance of CG and CSR, recent academic research has extensively 
examined the CG-CSR nexus (Mitchell, 2007; Jamali, Safieddine and Rabbath, 2008). In this 
paper, we build on the work of Jamali, Safieddine and Rabbath (2008) to study the CG-CSR 
nexus in the context of the Lebanese banking sector. In specific, we conduct a qualitative 
comparative study of the opinions of Lebanese bank managers, banking authorities and a bank 
association on CG, CSR and the CG-CSR nexus. Given the nascent nature of CG and CSR in 
Lebanon, no existing studies examine the CSR-CG nexus in the Lebanese context or in the 
Lebanese banking sector, in specific. We believe that such an exploration is warranted as it 
                                                           
1 These scandals include, but are not confined to, the collapse of Enron, Arthur Andersen, and WorldCom (Tricker, 
2012; Marsiglia and Falautano, 2005). 
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would shed light on the practice of CG and CSR as well as the interplay between CG and CSR in 
a developing country context. Our study therefore contributes to the existing literature on the 
CG-CSR nexus but from a developing country perspective. In view of the dearth of studies on 
the CG-CSR nexus in Lebanon, we opt for an explorative approach given that such a research 
design provides extensive information on the relationship between CG and CSR. More 
specifically, we adopt a qualitative research design which involves conducting in-depth semi-
structured interviews and analyzing the results of a questionnaire administered to five banks and 
banking authorities’ representatives. We employ a qualitative research design for two important 
motives: First, Boyce and Neale (2006) note that in-depth semi-structured interviews are an 
invaluable tool allowing researchers to shed light on different opinions. Second, our qualitative 
research design has the advantage of infrangibly exhuming the perceptions of the CSR and CG 
nexus of the banks and bank associations. Our main interest lies in examining whether 
differences in perspectives exist between bank managers and banking authorities (association) as 
they relate to their understanding of the nature of CG, CSR and the CSR-CG nexus.   
 
2. The CG-CSR Nexus: Related Literature 
We next review the existing studies on the CSR and CG nexus. The sizeable literatures on CG, 
CSR and the CG and CSR nexus force us to be selective in our review of the existing studies. We 
focus specifically on studies that directly tackle the CG-CSR nexus. 
Management scholars have been increasingly interested in examining the complementarities 
between CG and CSR. Rudolph (2005) and Elkington (2006) note that an overlap in the 
terminologies and cross-connections between CSR, ethics, and CG exists. Carr and Outhwaite, 
(2011) argue that complementarities exist in the relationship between CG and CSR. Bhimani and 
Soonawalla (2005) note that CG, CSR and stakeholder value creation constitute an integral 
component of the corporate responsibilities continuum. In a similar vein, Beltratti (2005) argues 
that CG and CSR are complementary and notes that an effective CG framework coupled with 
CSR engagement result in improved financial performance. Along the same lines, Van den 
Berghe and Louche (2005) assert that CG and CSR derive from the same attributes which 
include honesty, transparency and accountability while Rudolph (2005) and Elkington (2006) 
emphasize the cross-connections between CSR, ethics and CG. Jensen (2002) and Aguilera et al. 
(2007) argue that both CG and CSR are expressions of a firm’s moral and fiduciary 
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responsibilities towards its stakeholders. The studies above indicate that an overlap exists 
between the definitions of CSR and CG. According to Benders and Van Veen (2001), the 
increasing popularity of both CSR and CG generates some ambiguity in defining the confines of 
each. Other important contributions to the literature (Aguilera et al., 2006; Lea, 2004) also 
underscore the existence of complementarities between CG and CSR. In an attempt to 
conceptualize the relationship between CG, CSR and business ethics, Fassin and Van Rossem 
(2009) explore the distinctiveness and clarity in the perceptions that opinion leaders have 
concerning CG, CSR and business ethics, and the relationships that exist between them. 
 Two broad paradigms have emerged from the literature examining the CG-CSR nexus. One 
strand of the literature views CG as a foundation or pillar of CSR. That is, CG is an all-
encompassing concept under which CSR falls. Studies that fall into this strand of the literature 
include Sacconi (2006), Luo (2006), Aguilera et al. (2006), Claessens (2003), Carr and 
Outhwaite (2011), Claessens and Yirtoglu (2012), Elkington (2006) and McCarthy and Puffer 
(2008). In contrast to these studies, another strand of the literature gives CSR the "umbrella 
attribute" (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007; Basu and Palazzo, 2008). Conley and Williams (2005) 
epitomize the latter view by referring to CSR as the "new governance" mechanism.  
 Jamali, Safieddine and Rabbath (2008) suggest that there is an increasing overlap between CG 
and CSR and provide three frameworks through which to understand the CG-CSR nexus: (1) 
corporate governance as a pillar of corporate social responsibility, (2) corporate social 
responsibility as a dimension of corporate governance, and (3) corporate governance and 
corporate social responsibility as part of a continuum.  
 Some empirical evidence on the CSR-CG nexus also exists. Recent empirical studies 
formulate four testable hypotheses regarding the relationship between CG and CSR. The first 
hypothesis, developed by Barnea and Rubin (2010), uses Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency 
theory to argue that top managers have a tendency to over-invest in CSR in order to build an 
image of themselves as "good global citizens". Jo and Harjoto (2011) refer to this view as the 
over-investment hypothesis. Another hypothesis, due to Cespa and Cestone (2007), states that 
current CEOs engage in strategic CSR in order to decrease the probability of CEO turnover in 
the future. The third hypothesis states that in highly competitive markets, firms tend to use CSR 
to differentiate themselves from competitors and to signal the quality of their products (Fisman et 
al., 2005; 2006; Falck and Heblich, 2007). The final hypothesis, known as the conflict resolution 
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hypothesis, is based on the views of Jensen (2002), Scherer et al. (2006) and Calton and Payne 
(2003), who suggest that firms use CSR activities to resolve the conflicts between managers, 
investing and non-investing stakeholders.  In this context, we note that Harjoto and Jo (2011) 
assess the effects of internal (board structure and ownership concentration) and external 
(institutional ownership and monitoring by security analysts) governance mechanisms on the 
firm’s choice of CSR activities. Consistent with earlier empirical evidence, the authors provide 
evidence consistent with CSR being positively associated with governance mechanisms such as 
board leadership, board independence, institutional ownership, analyst following, and anti-
takeover provisions. Harjoto and Jo (2012) interpret their findings as being consistent with the 
resolution of the agency problem of Jensen and Meckling (1976). Arora and Dharwadkar (2011) 
examine the relationship between CG and CSR using four governance variables: managerial 
ownership, independent director representation, concentrated institutional ownership, and 
strength of shareholder rights (i.e. the threat of takeovers). The authors hypothesize that the 
relationship between CG and CSR is moderated by the satisfaction with firm performance. Their 
findings suggest that strong CG minimizes the risks of managers endorsing negative CSR. 
However, when firms perform well, the impact of governance on positive CSR is minimal, hence 
positive CSR is high. Furthermore, Harjoto and Jo (2011) argue that CSR engagement is 
positively related to effective governance mechanisms and to better firm performance through 
lessened agency costs and reduced conflict of interests among stakeholders. In subsequent work, 
Jo and Harjoto (2012) provide evidence of unidirectional causality from CG to CSR. More 
specifically, the authors find that a lagged measure of CG has a positive effect on CSR thereby 
supporting the conflict resolution hypothesis of Jensen (2002) and Scherer et al. (2006) 
according to which firms use CSR activities to resolve the conflicts between managers, investing 
and non-investing stakeholders.  
  The aforementioned literature offers different means to conceptualize the CG-CSR nexus and 
a definitive consensus is yet to emerge. Furthermore, only a limited number of studies examine 
the CG-CSR nexus in a developing country or banking context. In light of the paucity of research 
in these areas, this paper aims to address the gap in the literature by providing an in-depth 
qualitative examination of the CG, CSR and the CG-CSR nexus in the context of the Lebanese 
banking sector. A number of interesting findings emerge from our qualitative comparative study. 
First, Lebanese banks and banking regulators (association) have a common understanding of the 
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importance of CG. Second, despite the fact that both banks and banking regulators view CSR as 
a differentiation tool, the two parties’ views differ in relation to the ulterior motive underlying 
CSR engagement. Third, and perhaps most interestingly, the banks and banking authorities’ 
views on the CG-CSR nexus differ substantially. While the banking authorities view CSR as an 
expression of a good CG framework, the majority of the banks in our sample adhere to the view 
that CSR embeds CG thereby giving CSR an all-encompassing role. In line with their beliefs, the 
banking regulators have exerted concerted efforts to ensure a sound CG framework in the 
Lebanese banking sector without explicitly addressing CSR.  
 
3. The Lebanese Banking Sector and CG Context 
3.1. The Lebanese Banking Sector: Key Characteristics 
The Lebanese economy is largely reliant on its services sector which accounts for nearly 75% of 
Lebanon’s USD 42 billion Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The banking and tourism sectors are, 
in turn, the two largest industries in the services sector. The banking sector is known for its high 
capitalization and prudent investments. The sound regulatory oversight by Lebanon’s central 
bank, the Banque du Liban (BdL), and the banking control commission (BCC) are important 
factors which contribute to the stability of the sector. The country’s underdeveloped financial 
markets place the banking sector at the center of financial intermediation and Lebanese banks 
have traditionally been the sole source of credit for individuals and enterprises. The banking 
sector has also benefited from a continuous and sizeable inflow of remittances to maintain its 
high capitalization. By the end of 2011, the number of banks operating in Lebanon reached 68, 
from which 54 are commercial banks, 15 are investment banks and 4 are newly-established 
banks. These banks have 968 branches distributed all over the geography of Lebanon. According 
to the Association of Banks in Lebanon, there is one bank branch for every 5,000 persons 
whereas the average number of bank branches in the MENA region is one bank branch for every 
twenty thousand persons2 (Association of Banks in Lebanon, 2012). These numbers indicate the 
high market penetration of Lebanese banks and demonstrate that the Lebanese populace has high 
access to banking services relative to other MENA countries. In fact, the statistics on access to 
banking services are closer to the rates observed in developed countries.  
                                                           
2 This also compares to one branch for every eleven thousand persons in emerging countries. 
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 Figure 1 displays total assets in the Lebanese banking sector while Table 1 provides the 
aggregate growth rate in total assets of Lebanese banks for the period 2000 to 2012.  
                [Insert Figure 1 and Table 1 here] 
Despite some adverse economic, political and security developments over the period, Figure 1 
and Table 1 show a sustained increase in consolidated total assets of Lebanese banks. This steady 
growth in assets demonstrates the considerable resilience of the Lebanese banking sector.  
  
3.2. Corporate Governance in Lebanon 
Corporate Governance can be considered to be a relatively recent concept in Lebanon. 
Regulators and government officials instigated the dialogue on CG only in 2004. The main 
challenges facing a proper implementation of CG in Lebanon are the lack of general awareness 
about the subject and the attachment of several stakeholders to the traditional approaches and 
systems of management.  
 In fact, small to medium sized enterprises, mostly family-owned, are the main drivers of the 
Lebanese economy. Family-owned businesses are characterized by having owners that are 
inclined to manage their corporations themselves rather than to abide by policies and procedures 
that are set to regulate their businesses. The management of family-owned enterprises is, for 
instance, seldom sensitized to the need for an independent board member. The Lebanese banking 
sector, whose origins can also be firmly traced to family ownership, suffers from the same lack 
of awareness regarding the importance of sound CG. Another main obstacle facing the 
implementation of sound CG principles is a weak Lebanese legal system. The foundations of CG 
in Lebanon dates back to the Lebanese Code of Commerce, established in December 1942, as 
well as some additional conditions established by the Beirut Stock Exchange (BSE) regarding 
equity listing requirements. However, the Code of Commerce is outdated and does not tackle 
many key CG issues while the BSE listing requirements only impose certain disclosure and 
accounting standards (Chahine and Safieddine, 2009).3 Nonetheless, significant efforts are being 
made by two non-governmental enterprises, the Lebanese Transparency Association (LTA) and 
the Lebanese corporate Governance Task Force, who launched the first Lebanese Code of 
corporate governance on June 13, 2006 (The Lebanese Code of Corporate Governance, 2006).  
                                                           
3 A recently established capital markets regulator, the capital markets authority of Lebanon, is actively seeking to 
address some of the shortcomings in the Code of Commerce. 
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 While these efforts are voluntary and addressed to all Lebanese companies, BdL, in its 
capacity as the main banking sector’s supervisory entity, issues rules and guidelines on CG that 
are addressed specifically to the banking sector. In fact, BdL has the power to issue mandatory 
regulations related to CG to commercial banks and has spearheaded various initiatives and 
developed extensive guidelines of good CG.4 Table 2 provides a listing of the most important 
BdL directives (also known as circulars) on CG. 
      [Insert Table 2 here] 
As evident from the list of circulars in Table 2, the central bank placed significant emphasis on 
mandating good CG practices. For instance, circular 106, titled “Corporate Governance”, 
requires banks, among other provisions, to draft and disseminate on their websites a corporate 
governance guide which contains details on the organizational chart and board of directors 
(including compensation). Similarly, circulars 118 and 122 address, respectively, the 
establishment of board committees as well as the appointment of external auditors. In fact, the 
central bank’s repeated efforts in promoting a culture of good CG in the commercial banking 
industry culminated in the development of a BdL unit dedicated to raising awareness regarding 
CG. The BCC monitors the banks’ compliance with these decisions and fines are imposed on 
non-complying banks. 
 
3.3. Corporate Social Responsibility in Lebanon 
Jamali and Mirshak (2007) note that CSR continues to be perceived by Lebanese corporates as a 
voluntary philanthropic exercise. Jamali and Mishrak (2007)’s study also reveals that none of the 
companies comprising their sample developed clear objectives, measurements or due diligence in 
their pursuit of CSR activities. 
 Nonetheless, the Lebanese banking sector, spurred in part by BdL’s initiatives, has shown 
greater affinities towards CSR. In fact, BdL has been encouraging banks to engage in CSR by 
spearheading the following initiatives: (i) encouraging entrepreneurs by promoting small loans, 
(ii) subsidizing the interest rates on productive loans, (iii) subsidizing educational loans and 
housing loans, (iv) subsidizing loans for environment-friendly projects, and (v) asking banks to 
investigate the environmental and social impact of the projects that they finance particularly by 
applying the “Equator Principles” proposed in October 2002 by the International Finance 
                                                           
4 The complete circulars are available at http://www.bdl.gov.lb/circulars/index/5/33/0/Basic-Circulars.html. 
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Corporation (IFC) and (v) actively participating in events that promote CSR. As a concrete 
example of BdL’s drive to encourage CSR activities by Lebanese banks, the central bank 
introduced, in January 2013, a US$1.46 billion stimulus package comprising subsidized loans 
that are earmarked to environmentally friendly projects and companies, solar energy projects, 
and other entrepreneurial ventures (World Bank, 2013).  
 
4. Questionnaire Design and Surveyed Institutions 
We employ data from two sources: (i) qualitative data collected from banks and from key 
banking authorities and a bank association in Lebanon and (ii) data collected from in-depth 
interviews that were conducted with senior managers of banks and bank regulatory institutions. 
Some additional data are collected from the website of the banks comprising our sample. The 
first group of interviews was conducted with Lebanese authorities and regulators in order to 
assess the importance of corporate governance and corporate social responsibility in the banking 
industry. The aim of these interviews is to take stock of the authorities’ point of view on the 
relationship between CG and CSR.  
 The second group of interviews involved senior managers (corporate social responsibility, 
compliance or marketing managers) from a sample of Lebanese banks. The goal of these 
interviews is to examine the banks’ practices in terms of CG and CSR. In specific, the interviews 
aim to gauge the managers’ perceptions of the link between the two paradigms.   
 A questionnaire comprising open and close-ended questions was designed. The questionnaire, 
provided in full in Appendix A, is composed of three sections. The first relates to the CG 
mechanisms and practices employed in the sample of banks considered in our analysis. The 
second section investigates the CSR paradigm at the banks and the final section is designed to 
address the relationship between CG and CSR as suggested by Jamali et al. (2008).  
 
4.1. Surveyed Banks 
Our survey and interviews were conducted with five Lebanese banks: Bank Audi, Bank Libano-
Française, Fransabank, Banque du Liban et D’outre Mer (BLOM) and BLC bank. The surveyed 
banks are large in terms of asset size and have deposits in excess of USD 2 billion. Panel A of 
Table 3 provides the names of the surveyed banks as well as the exact title of the surveyed 
manager within each bank.  
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        [Insert Table 3 here] 
In Lebanon, banks are grouped by the Association of Banks in Lebanon into four clusters 
according to the size of their deposits. The first cluster, known as the Alpha group, comprises 
banks with deposits in excess of USD 2 billion. The Beta group consists of banks with deposits 
ranging between USD 500 million and USD 2 billion and the gamma group contains banks with 
deposits ranging between USD 200 million and USD 500 million. The final group, known as the 
delta group, consists of banks with deposits under USD 200 million.  
 Table 4 presents a summary of Bilanbanques (2011)’s grouping. 
          [Insert Table 4 here] 
The surveyed banks have a geographic presence in all of Lebanon and some of the banks also 
have foreign subsidiaries. The banks are selected based on their reputation, size (in terms of 
assets) and their involvement in CSR activities.  
 
4.2. Surveyed Governmental Institutions and Bank Association 
Our sample comprises five governmental entities that have a direct banking oversight role or 
whose mandates at the macroeconomic level can affect banks indirectly. We also survey an 
important Lebanese bank association. The names of the surveyed governmental institutions as 
well the title of the surveyed person within each of the institutions are provided in Panels A and 
B of Table 3. 
 The governmental institutions tasked with a direct supervisory role over banks are: the 
Banking Control Commission (BCC), the Banque du Liban (BdL) and the special investigation 
commission (SIC). BdL, Lebanon’s central bank, started operating in April 1964 and was 
established pursuant to the Lebanese code of money and credit of 1963. The central bank is 
considered to be the chief regulatory authority of the Lebanese banking sector and enjoys, unlike 
other public institutions, administrative and financial autonomy. In addition to its main monetary 
policy and foreign exchange stability mandates, BdL is tasked with ensuring the soundness of the 
banking sector and is the sole authority capable of granting licenses for the establishment of new 
banks, financial institutions, brokerage firms, money dealers, foreign banks, leasing companies 
and mutual funds in Lebanon. BdL has the authority to issue directives, known as circulars, with 
which banks operating in Lebanon are forced to comply. 
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 The BCC performs its supervisory functions as an independent body but in close coordination 
with BdL (who has the legal prerogative to ask for all the reports of the BCC). The BCC’s 
functions is to supervise banks, financial institutions, money dealers, brokerage firms and leasing 
companies and fulfills its duties through periodic on-site and off-site examinations of the entities 
it supervises. Among other specific mandates, the BCC is tasked with ensuring that (i) its 
supervisees abide by the provisions of the Lebanese Code of Money and Credit and (ii) its 
supervisees abide by BdL and BCC’s circulars. The final direct supervisory entity, the SIC, has a 
narrower mandate than BdL and BCC and is tasked with fighting money laundering. 
 Through its aims of developing a legal environment conducive to economic development, 
higher employment and greater social welfare, the Ministry of Economy and Trade (MoET) 
plays an important role at the macroeconomic level. Its specific mandate of consumer protection 
also gives the MoET an indirect supervisory role over banks. The final institution in our survey, 
the Association of Banks in Lebanon (ABL) is a non-governmental banking association which 
aims to strengthen cooperation among the member banks and to safeguard the interests of the 
banking sector. One important function undertaken by ABL is to liaise with the banking 
authorities regarding current and proposed regulations. ABL also promulgates legislations whose 
goal is to promote the banking sector.  
 
5. CG and CSR from the Authorities’ and Banks’ Perspectives 
5.1. CG from the governmental institutions and bank association’s perspective 
A summary of the survey responses of the four governmental institutions and the banking 
association regarding their CG paradigm are provided in Panel A of Table 5. 
          [Insert Table 5 here] 
As noted earlier, Lebanese authorities made several gradual attempts to promote best practices in 
terms of CG. The overriding concern in the Lebanese regulators’ initiatives is to familiarize 
Lebanese banks with the notion of CG. It can be argued that the gradual approach that the 
regulators adopted is consistent with Bhasin’s (2010) arguments according to which ensuring 
effective governance evolves gradually from the "compliance" to a "conscience" approach to 
CG. 
 The recommendations of Lebanese regulators with regards to CG are also in line with the 
findings of academic research highlighting the importance of adequate CG mechanisms and 
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controls in monitoring and maintaining managerial performance. In specific, the BdL and BCC 
circulars, which require banks to have adequate internal control mechanisms and independent 
board committees, echo the recommendations of Newman (2000) and Ruigrok et al. (2006).  The 
previous two studies underscore the important role of non-executive directors in using objective 
and professional judgment to monitor managerial performance.  Newman (2000) and Ruigrok et 
al. (2006) also note that oversight by sub-committees ensure the integrity of the financial 
statements. 
 During the interview process, the banking authorities (association) also underlined the 
importance of effective internal control mechanisms in facilitating regulatory oversight. This 
view is consistent with a sizeable strand of the literature (Solomon et al., 2000; Spira and Page 
2003 and Jones, 2008) which emphasizes internal control as one of the most important CG 
mechanisms.  
 The views of the banking regulatory bodies and associations also suggest a clear link between 
good CG and financial performance. Indeed, both banks and banking authorities agree that the 
Lebanese banking sector cannot “afford” a weak CG and that effective CG mitigates high risks 
which may, in turn, cause serious losses. For instance, a banking authority interviewee states: 
“we simply cannot afford a weak CG in our banking sector. From the mere fact that Lebanon 
depends a lot on the banking sector and that we have systemic banks in our economy that 
constitute the building blocks of the sector, there has to be a continuous supervision of the sector, 
and we, regulators, cannot be in the banks all the time to monitor all their activities. Good CG is 
the only thing that protects banks” while a banking sector interviewee remarks “Banks have to be 
very vigilant to the detrimental effects of weak corporate governance and compliance. They can 
be one the primary reasons for bank failure”.  
The previously discussed relation between CG and financial performance has been extensively 
studied in existing research and will be discussed, in more length, in Section 6 of the paper. The 
banking authorities also note that good CG in the Lebanese banking sector is poised for takeoff 
as banks are increasingly more integrated into international financial markets. Such integration 
will, in turn, further elucidate the importance that foreign investors, regulators and banking 
institutions place on sound CG principles and foster a greater appreciation of the benefits of good 
CG for Lebanese banks. 
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5.2. CG from the Banks’ Perspective 
A summary of the survey responses of the banks are provided in Panel A of Table 6.  
     [Insert Table 6 here] 
The survey responses reveal that there has been an increased awareness regarding the importance 
of CG across all the banks in our sample. In fact, the management of each of the surveyed banks 
demonstrates both an interest and a profound understanding of the importance of good CG. 
Using Bhasin’s (2010) terminology, we view this evidence as suggesting that Lebanese banks are 
moving from the traditional "compliance" to the "conscience" approach in implementing CG. 
The survey responses also uncover that CG is a central component to the strategy and core values 
of each of the banks. It is important to note that all the banks in our survey dedicate a section of 
their website to CG and include information regarding CG as an essential component of their 
annual reports.  
 The survey responses also show that the interviewed banks were compliant with BdL’s 
requirements on good CG. All the banks have independent and non-executive board members, 
audit and risk committees, adequate disclosure, and internal audit departments. In fact, a majority 
of the banks established more than two board committees relating to internal audit and risk 
thereby exceeding BdL’s requirements in that respect. In addition, our interviews with managers 
show that accountability and transparency are major concerns for Lebanese banks. More 
specifically, the responses of managers suggest that if these two elements are absent, CG will be 
significantly weakened and the bank’s reputation and performance will be at significant risk.5  
 
5.3. CSR from the Banking Authorities’ Perspective 
The summary of the governmental authorities and bank association’s responses on their CSR 
paradigm, presented in Panel B of Table 5, suggest that governmental institutions and ABL are 
aware of CSR’s benefits for different stakeholders and society at large. The banking authorities 
view the current CSR activities of Lebanese banks as falling under the philanthropic type of 
responsibility, discussed by Carroll (1979), according to which banks voluntarily choose to 
engage in social activities that are neither required by law nor ethically expected. Banks, 
                                                           
5 In fact, weak CG and compliance with international standards is thought to have led to the collapse of the 
Lebanese-Canadian bank. 
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according to banking authorities, engage in CSR activities with the goal of achieving financial 
gains.  
 In the authorities’ view, there is a positive relation between CSR investments and financial 
performance. This implies, in turn, that the short-term goals, such as building a socially 
responsible image, gaining customers’ confidence and using CSR as a marketing or public 
relations tool underlie these CSR activities. This view suggests that banks benefit financially 
from their CSR engagement and might thereby use CSR as a differentiation tool. Nonetheless, 
the banking authorities maintain that despite the fact that banks’ CSR activities are aimed at 
achieving financial gains, society benefits from such an engagement. The Lebanese banking 
authorities’ views are also consistent with Lantos’s (2001) arguments according to which CSR is 
critical to the firm's viability.  
 Although the central bank does not yet issue clear CSR guidelines for banks, BdL is 
encouraging banks to use CSR in a strategic manner. This is done by BdL tackling Lebanese 
society’s vital needs such as (i) subsidizing housing and education loans and (ii) encouraging 
environmentally friendly, agricultural, touristic and industrial projects. These initiatives coincide 
with Porter and Kramer’s (2006) strategic CSR activities whereby banks are encouraged to 
engage in a number of activities whose social and business benefits are distinctive and large. 
 Our interview results also suggest that banks need to prioritize social needs and place them at 
the core of their business (Porter and Kramer, 2006). These needs may belong to a variety of 
stakeholders such as their employees, their customers or to society at large. If applied 
strategically, banks will benefit from improved customer loyalty, employee retention, enhanced 
goodwill and, ultimately, enhanced financial performance. By doing so, banks can effectively 
create Porter and Kramer’s (2011) shared value which is essential for effective competition and 
profit maximization.  
 The banking authorities and ABL agree that mandating CSR is unwarranted at this stage 
given that the focus should be on ensuring effective CG rather than forcing banks to engage in 
CSR. While the banking authorities believe that CSR is making important strides in the Lebanese 
banking sector, they note that a gradual shift which results in CSR being viewed as a strategic 
goal rather than a marketing tool is needed.  
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5.4. CSR from Banks’ Perspective 
The summary of the banks’ survey responses on CSR, presented in Panel B of Table 6, suggest 
that globalization, the emergence of environmental awareness and the global appeal of 
responsible business practices contributed to a greater appreciation of the importance of CSR in 
the Lebanese banking sector. This evolving comprehension of CSR translated into banks 
establishing formal CSR programs through dedicated units, officers, and committees. In fact, 
four out of the five banks in our sample have a formal CSR program. Only a single bank has 
several CSR initiatives that were not combined into a formal program.  
 The banks’ CSR initiatives have the full support of the management. Furthermore, the top 
management of some of the banks spearheads the organizations’ efforts in initiating CSR 
programs and leading the institutions towards social responsibility. The interviewed banks also 
have dedicated sections on their websites (or in their annual reports) that explicitly state their 
views on CSR and summarize their main CSR activities.  
 Another interesting finding emerging from the survey responses is a common CSR focus of 
Lebanese banks which includes the community, the environment, people, education and health. 
For instance, the surveyed banks emphasize employee training and workshops, promoting gender 
equality, participating in philanthropic sporting activities, giving scholarships and holding 
regular educational events, establishing large networks of branches, fostering partnerships with 
NGOs and sponsoring green initiatives. A few banks evolved from philanthropic CSR towards 
more strategic CSR. For example, some banks endorse international CSR initiatives such as the 
UN Global Compact (e.g., Fransabank), commit themselves to universal principles such as the 
UN Women Empowerment Principles (e.g., BLC bank that also initiated the “we-initiative” 
supporting the same cause), or take part in the pilot program for ISO 26000 (e.g., Audi and Blom 
bank). Other strategic CSR goals include aiming at educating the youth and developing products 
and services that are believed to be beneficial for society (e.g., micro credit lending developed by 
Fransabank). Finally, one bank has also extended its CSR environmentally friendly initiatives to 
its value chain by applying the equator principles with its suppliers and clients.  
 In sum, all the banks in our sample are currently practicing philanthropic (or altruistic) CSR 
by voluntarily engaging in social activities (Carroll, 1979; Lantos, 2001). However, some banks 
are also involved in certain aspects of strategic CSR whereby banks’ incentives of reaping 
financial benefits coincide with the welfare of stakeholders (Lantos, 2001). The banks’ main 
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objective from engaging in CSR is to give back to their community. Only two banks view 
promoting economic development in the country as part of their CSR objectives. Consistent with 
existing research (Barnea and Rubin, 2010; Jo and Harjoto, 2011), the summary of the banks’ 
responses on their CSR paradigm also suggest that banks view CSR as means through which to 
build a better reputation, enhance corporate image and differentiate themselves from 
competitors. Two banks firmly stated that CSR and enhanced financial performance are linked to 
each other while others believed that this relationship is only supported by strategic CSR.  
 Overall, our analysis also suggests that Lebanese banks did not reach the level of a full-
fledged strategic CSR which entails the fulfillment of specific philanthropic responsibilities that 
simultaneously benefit the bottom line (Lantos, 2001; Porter and Kramer, 2006).  
 
6. The CG-CSR Nexus in the Lebanese Banking Industry 
6.1. The CG-CSR Nexus from the Banking Authorities’ Perspective 
The summary of the banking authorities’ and ABL responses in relation to the CG-CSR nexus 
are presented in Panel C of Table 5. Consistent with a strand of the existing research (Luo, 
2006), the banking authorities view CSR as an integral component of good CG. The banking 
authorities’ views lend credence to the second pillar of the CG-CSR nexus advocated by Jamali 
et al. (2008) according to which CSR is a dimension of an overall CG framework. 
 In fact, according to BCC and BdL, CSR represents an external expression of a good CG 
system (Strandberg, 2005). For instance, a banking authority interviewee voiced the following 
opinion: “CSR comes as an extension to CG. Banks should start by setting their global strategy 
by identifying the rights of their different stakeholders and by setting the adequate rules and 
procedures that respect these rights and ensure accountability”. The same interviewee also notes 
that: “when you have a good CG framework, you are assumed to have a well-defined strategy 
and all of your activities will subsequently flow from it. CSR would then be strategic and well-
implemented”. The clearest expression of the view that CSR follows from the overall CG 
framework comes another banking authority representative who stated that “In my opinion, CG 
is a whole. My target is good CG and it allows me to do CSR”. The views expressed by the 
Lebanese banking authorities therefore contradict a strand of research (Fassin and Van Rossem; 
2009; Scherer and Palazzo, 2007; Basu and Palazzo, 2008) which advocates CSR as an all-
encompassing concept. According to the banking authorities, banks should, at a first stage, 
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define their global strategy by taking into account the rights of their different stakeholders and 
setting the adequate rules and procedures that safeguard these rights.  
 In line with Jo and Harjoto (2011, 2012), the banking authorities echo the view that there is a 
positive relationship between CSR and financial performance. As a case in point, a banking 
authority interviewee notes that “If I was good to the community, the community will give back 
with goodness. If I am good to the environment, it may cost me a little at the beginning but then 
it will impact me positively” while another banking authority interviewee states that “CSR gives 
a good corporate image. A good image is publicity and that is good for business”. Consistent 
with the prior views, a third banking authority interviewee remarks “Banks in Lebanon tend to 
use CSR as a marketing tool. In other words, they use CSR to differentiate themselves and gain 
clients’ confidence in the hope of achieving better financial performance”.  
 
6.2. The CG-CSR Nexus from Banks’ Perspective 
A number of interesting findings regarding the CG-CSR nexus emerge from the summary of the 
banks’ interview responses presented in Panel C of Table 6. First, all interviewees recognize that 
CG and CSR are not two distinct concepts and that an overlap exists between them. Second, in 
contrast to the banking authorities’ views, three out of the five banks give CSR the umbrella 
attribute. For instance, a banking sector interviewee expresses the view that “there is certainly a 
relationship between CG and CSR. A solid CG is part of CSR. I also think that effective CG can 
affect CSR” while the interviewee from another bank states “CG is a component in the main 
frame of CSR. None are bigger than the other but I would argue that CSR has the umbrella 
attribute and CG comes first”. The latter view is congruent with Jamali et al. (2008)’s first 
paradigm according to which CG is a pillar of CSR. Only one of the surveyed bank managers 
believes that CG should be the foundation for CSR as argued by Strandberg (2005) whereas 
another two banks believe that CG is an important pillar of CSR. Nevertheless, three bank 
representatives agree with Fassin and Van Rossem (2009), Scherer and Palazzo (2007) and Basu 
and Palazzo (2008) by granting CSR the “umbrella attribute".  
Our survey results and interviews also suggest that Lebanese bank managers adhere to the 
view that CSR positively affects financial performance and indicate that they tend to view CSR 
as a strategic differentiator or a marketing tool. For example, one interviewee notes that “CSR 
results in bank having a good reputation and a good reputation contributes to image building and 
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good marketing. Of course, all of this results in higher profits in the long-run”. Interestingly, 
while the other interviewed bank managers shared the view that CSR engagement might result in 
improved financial performance, they did not, contrary to the bank authorities and regulators’ 
assertions, explicitly refer to the use CSR as a marketing tool. 
 
7. Discussion of Findings  
7.1. Comparative Analysis of CG: Authorities vs. Banks’ Perspective 
Our findings suggest that the Lebanese banking sector is abreast of the importance of good CG 
and has adopted, largely because of the banking authorities’ directives, good CG principles. The 
comparison of the two perspectives of CG (authorities’ vs. banks’ perspective) shows that 
conviction plays an integral role when adopting good CG. However, banking regulators and 
supervisors need to continue their efforts in terms of monitoring banks’ implementation of CG.  
 Our findings also reveal that banks and banking authorities appreciate the importance of 
balancing the interests of all stakeholders when making decisions. Having CG embedded in the 
core values of the institution certainly serves this end. Tables 5 and 6 show that the interviewed 
parties unanimously agree that CG has a promising future in Lebanon but they also note the 
difficulties in implementing CG outside the confines of the banking sector due to the family-
owned nature of Lebanese corporations. Our interview results therefore suggest that further 
effort should be directed at educating family-owned businesses about the advantages of sound 
CG. Given the extensive efforts that the BCC and BdL exert in promoting a culture of good CG, 
it is very likely for the culture of sound CG to persist and evolve. 
 
7.2. Comparative Analysis of CSR: Authorities vs. Banks’ Perspective 
A comparison between the banking authorities’ and banks’ views on CSR uncovers a number of 
similarities. Both parties agree that CSR activities serve to differentiate the bank from 
competitors and enhance financial performance. Nonetheless, the banking authorities and banks 
disagree on the ultimate motive behind CSR. While banking authorities view banks’ CSR 
engagement as a marketing tool, bank managers note that their motive in undertaking CSR 
activities is to give back to the community. The banking authorities and bank association’s views 
are consistent with Barnea and Rubin’s (2010) arguments according to which top managers have 
a tendency to over-invest in CSR in order to build an image as good citizens. The findings also 
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support Jo and Harjoto (2011) who contend that, in today’s highly competitive markets, firms 
tend to use CSR to differentiate themselves from competitors. The two parties share the view that 
CSR in Lebanon is poised for a brighter future and that strategic CSR activities will dominate the 
banks’ engagement agenda in the long-run. While banking authorities overwhelmingly agree 
that, unlike CG, CSR should not be mandated (Panel B of Table 5), two bank managers’ 
reactions to mandating CSR was positive. In addition, the responses in Panel B of Tables 5 and 6 
indicate both banking authorities’ and banks’ representatives (with the exception of one bank) 
broadly agree view CSR engagement as conducive to good financial performance. However, the 
banking authorities’ opinions were communicated much more forcefully than the banks’.  
 
7.3. Comparative Analysis of the CG-CSR Nexus  
Our comparative analysis of the banks and banking authorities’ views on the CG-CSR nexus 
reveals a number of differences.  While both parties agree that the two concepts are related, they 
disagree in their definition of the nature of this relationship. First, the banking authorities as well 
as one bank consider CSR as a part of CG whereas the other banks believed that CG is part of the 
CSR. Second, whereas the banking authorities affirm that effective CG affects CSR investments 
and that effective governance can cause CSR, the evidence from the banks’ survey responses did 
not support this hypothesis. Third, while authorities firmly state that firm performance and 
availability of resources affect CSR investments, the surveyed banks did not unanimously agree. 
It is important to note that both banks and banking authorities believe that CG and CSR can 
positively affect the financial performance of the firm. These latter views are consistent with the 
conclusions drawn from prior empirical research on financial performance and CG/CSR.   
More specifically, the existing empirical research (Kaplan and Reishus, 1990; Yermack 
1996, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003; Cremers and Nair, 2005; Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrel, 
2009; Chhaochharia and Grisstein 2007; Ammann, Oesch and Schmid, 2011) suggests a positive 
relationship between good CG and firm value.6 In the prior studies, CG is measured using 
several metrics. Yermack (1996) provides empirical evidence of an inverse relationship  between 
the size of board and firm value. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) construct a governance 
index which reflects the strength of shareholder rights and the balance of power between 
                                                           
6 Using panel data regressions, Garcia-Castro, Arino, Canela (2010) do not reach a similar conclusions regarding the 
relationship between social and financial performance. The authors argue that endogeneity drives the positive 
relationship between social and financial performance uncovered in prior studies.  
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management and shareholders. Using the constructed index, the authors show that the returns on 
portfolios comprising firms with strong shareholder rights are larger than those of portfolios 
consisting of firms with high management power. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrel (2009) develop a 
managerial entrenchment index and provide empirical evidence suggesting that higher levels of 
managerial entrenchment are associated with economically important decreases in firm value. 
The views of the bank managers and banking authorities therefore echo the conclusions of this 
strand of the literature.  
A parallel strand of the financial economics literature argues that a more extensive CSR 
engagement is associated with a lower cost of debt (El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, Mishra, 2011; 
Oikonomou, Brooks and Pavelin, 2014) and a better credit rating (Attig, El Ghoul, Guedhami, 
Suh, 2013). The views expressed by the banks and banking authorities, according to which CSR 
engagement leads to better financial performance, therefore concur with conclusions of the prior 
studies. It also lends credence to the banking authorities’ view that CSR is used by banks as a 
differentiator. 
 
8. Conclusions and Limitations and Future Research  
This paper studies the CG-CSR nexus in the context of the Lebanese banking sector using a 
qualitative comparative study of the opinions of Lebanese bank managers, banking authorities 
and a bank association. Our findings reveal that disagreements exist between the Lebanese banks 
and banking authorities in defining the CG-CSR nexus. While CG is viewed as an all-
encompassing concept by the banking authorities, most banks ascribe to the paradigm that CG is 
component of CSR.  
Our results have several implications for the understanding and practice of CSR and CG in the 
Lebanese banking sector. First, our findings suggest that the culture of sound CG in the Lebanese 
banking sector is likely to persist and evolve in view of the continued efforts of the banking 
regulators in promoting CG as well as the strong belief of banking sector representatives in the 
importance of CG. Second, our results indicate that CSR is not likely to be mandated in the 
Lebanese banking sector. 
 Our results also shed light on the understanding of CG and CSR in the Lebanese banking 
sector. For instance, the culture of having an extended CSR model that targets all stakeholders is 
not yet actively promoted by banking authorities. In fact, the Lebanese banking authorities did 
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not explicitly allude to CSR in their directives even though bank managers appear to be abreast 
of the concept of CSR and its importance.  
 An interesting avenue for future research would be to examine the CG-CSR nexus for a 
larger sample of Lebanese banks and corporations Ideally, the cross-section of firms should not 
be confined to the banking sector and should span service providers, manufacturers, small to 
medium size enterprises and family-owned businesses. Such a sample would allow us to test, for 
example, whether family-owned firms are more reluctant to institute CG principles. 
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Figure 1: Total Assets of the Lebanese Banking Sector (2000 – 2012), (Banque du Liban, 
Retrieved January 4, 2013) 
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Table 1. Growth Rate of Aggregate Bank Assets for the period 2000-2012  
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Growth 11% 6% 10% 14% 13% 1% 8% 11% 15% 22% 12% 9% 8% 
Notes: The data are obtained from Banque du Liban (BdL). The growth rates are in annualized percentage terms. 
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Table 2. Banque Du Liban (BdL) Circulars on Corporate Governance 
Date Decision Title Details 
15-Dec-2000 Circular #77 
(amended in 
21/4/2011 by the 
Intermediate Circular # 
254) 
Internal Control 
and Internal Audit 
in Banks and 
Financial 
Institutions 
1. Requires Senior 
Management to establish 
an internal control 
framework which entails 
the set of regulations, 
policies and procedures 
issued to control the risks 
that the bank or financial 
institution faces or may 
face and therefore to 
protect their assets. 
2. Requires the Board of 
Directors (BOD) of every 
bank operating in 
Lebanon to establish an 
“Internal Audit Unit”. 
The unit should be 
entirely independent from 
the bank's operational 
management and shall 
have no executive 
responsibilities. 
21-Feb-2001 Circular #81 Operations relating 
to credit, 
investment, 
shareholding and 
participation 
 Requires the approval of 
a “Specialized 
Committee” within the 
bank and financial 
institution in respect of: 
Credit and investment 
related decisions, real 
estate investments, and 
transactions for the 
bank’s own account on 
structured products and 
derivatives. 
18-Apr-2001 Circular #83 Regulations on the 
Control of 
Financial and 
Banking 
Operations for 
Fighting Money 
Laundering and 
Terrorist 
Financing 
Lays down the 
framework for 
supervising banking and 
financial transactions to 
prevent money 
laundering. 
9-Mar-2006 Circular #103 Requirements to 1. Sets the minimum 
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practice specific 
functions in the 
banking and 
financial sectors 
standards (education, 
technical, expertise, 
social skills, etc…) 
required from persons 
performing certain 
functions in the banking 
and financial sectors in 
Lebanon, in order to 
preserve the stability of 
these sectors and protect 
their customers. 
2. Prohibits banks and 
financial institutions from 
hiring/contracting with 
any person to perform a 
“Regulated Function” 
unless this person meets 
the qualifications and 
conditions stipulated in 
the circular, including 
certain examinations 
related to their fields. 
26-Jul-2006 Circular #106 
(amended in 
21/4/2011 by the 
Intermediate Circular # 
254) 
Corporate 
Governance 
1. Outlines the definition 
of “Executive Senior 
Management”. 
2. Requires banks to 
spare no effort to comply 
with the principles issued 
and to be issued by the 
International Basel 
Committee for Enhancing 
Corporate Governance in 
Banking Institutions. 
3. Requires banks to 
prepare their own 
“Corporate Governance 
Guide” and publish a 
summary of it through 
their website and in their 
annual report. 
4. Requires Lebanese 
banks to enhance the 
Board of Directors by 
electing a sufficient 
number of Board 
nonexecutive and 
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independent members. 
5. Requires the Board of 
Directors to establish an 
Audit Committee chosen 
among the Board’s non- 
executive members and 
formed of three persons 
at least. 
6. Requires the Board of 
Directors to establish a 
Risk Committee chosen 
among the Board’s 
members and formed of 
three persons at least. 
27-Sept-2007 Circular #112 Corporate 
Governance in 
Islamic Banks 
1. Requires that Islamic 
Banks abide by the 
corporate governance 
circulars. 
2. Requires Islamic banks 
to establish a “Corporate 
Governance Unit”. 
21-July-2008 Circular #118 Boards of 
Directors and 
Boards 
Committees in 
Lebanese Banks 
1. Defines the terms non-
executive and 
independent board 
members. 
2. Requires the election 
of non-executive and 
independent board 
members to the board. 
3. Requires that the board 
meets at least four times 
per year. 
13-Aug-2009 Circular # 122 Rules and 
Procedures for 
Auditors’ 
Appointment 
1. Specifies a three-year 
term for the appointment 
of auditors and requires 
the principle of partner 
rotation for the auditor. 
2. Requires the 
appointment of two 
external auditors. 
12-Jan-2012 Circular # 128 Compliance 
Department 
Requires the 
establishment of a 
compliance department 
and outlines the 
credentials of the head of 
the compliance 
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department. 
6-August-2014 Circular # 133 Remunerations 
and Bonuses 
granted to bank 
employees 
Outlines policies relating 
to the acceptable forms of 
remuneration and 
bonuses of bank 
employees. 
Nov-2009 BDL creates a 
“Corporate Governance 
Unit” 
 The main objectives of 
this unit are: 
1. Spreading the CG 
culture and best practices 
in the banking and 
financial sector 
2. Following up on the 
recent developments in 
the field of CG and 
recommending the 
necessary and appropriate 
standards and rules to 
enhance CG in the 
Lebanese banking sector. 
3. Observing the banks 
and financial institutions’ 
compliance with CG 
guidelines. 
4. Proposing amendments 
to existing laws and 
regulations 
Notes: The table provides a listing of the most important Banque du Liban (the central bank of Lebanon) circulars 
pertaining to corporate governance. It also summarizes the main directives in each of the listed circulars.  
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Table 3. Surveyed Institutions and Managers 
Panel A: Interviewed Banks       
Institution Line of Business Geographic Origin 
Geographic 
Reach 
Managers 
interviewed 
Banque Libano-
Francaise (BLF) 
S.A.L. 
Banking services Lebanese Regional 
Head of Internal 
Communication 
and CSR 
Banque Audi 
S.A.L 
Banking services Lebanese Regional CSR Officer 
Fransabank S.A.L Banking services Lebanese Regional 
Head of Marketing 
and Corporate 
Communication 
Division /Deputy 
Head of Marketing 
and Corporate 
Communication 
Division. 
BLOM Bank 
S.A.L 
Banking services Lebanese Regional 
Deputy Chief Risk 
Officer/ Head of 
Communication 
Department 
BLC S.A.L Banking services Lebanese Regional 
Senior Officer in 
the Chairman’s 
office and Head of 
CSR Committee/ 
Head of Credit and 
Financial Risks in 
the Risk 
Management 
Department and 
Member of the 
CSR Committee. 
Panel B: Interviewed Governmental Institutions and Bank Association   
Institution Line of Business Geographic Origin 
Geographic 
Reach 
Managers 
interviewed 
Association of 
banks in Lebanon 
(ABL) 
Governmental Body  Lebanese  Local  
Head of Training 
Department  
Special 
Investigation 
Commission (SIC) 
Governmental Body  Lebanese  Local  SIC Secretary 
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Ministry of 
Economy and 
Trade 
Governmental body Lebanese Local 
Senior Legal Trade 
Specialist and 
Intellectual 
Property Expert  
Banque du Liban Governmental body Lebanese Local 
Senior Officer at 
the Corporate 
Governance Unit 
Banking Control 
Commission 
Governmental body Lebanese Local 
Head of 
Regulation 
Development and 
Macro-Prudential 
Department 
Notes: The table provides a listing of the institutions and titles of the interviewees. It also reports the line of 
business, geographic reach and origin of each institution. 
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Table 4. Groupings of Lebanese Banks by Asset Size 
 As of 12/2011 
  
Number 
of Banks 
Total Deposits 
in USD 
Alpha Group 13 > USD 2 Billion 
Beta Group 17 USD 500 Million  – 2 Billion 
Gamma Group 8 USD   200 – 500 Million 
Delta Group 31 <  USD 200 Million 
            Notes: The table provides the grouping of Lebanese 
                                       banks by asset size. 
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Table 5. Summary of Banking Authorities’ Responses 
Panel A: CG Paradigm 
Indicator/ 
Institution 
ABL SIC BCC 
Ministry of Economy and 
Trade 
BdL 
Understanding 
of CG 
Separation 
between Board 
of directors and 
between 
managers, 
financial 
control, anti-
money laundry, 
auditing and 
compliance 
functions. 
Set of rules and 
procedures, 
organization structures 
and policies for 
preserving the 
sustainability and 
integrity in the 
operations, ensuring 
the assets and resources 
are well organized, 
ensuring compliance, 
and interests of 
stakeholders are being 
met. 
Having a board in the 
first place and second, 
having the “right” 
people in the board by 
getting independent 
and non-executive 
members on the board. 
CG is the only thing 
that protects banks. 
Improving Transparency 
mainly by tackling companies’ 
board structure, the CEO’s 
power, Board Committees, 
BOD meetings, Segregation of 
duties… 
Promoting 
enhanced 
communication, 
better distribution 
of rights between 
different 
stakeholders, and 
transparency, 
credibility and 
enhanced control 
over operations and 
induced risks. 
Follow up of 
CG issues in 
banks 
Yes. We did 
committees and 
subcommittees 
to tell banks to 
follow CG 
guidelines. But 
there are 
problems with 
compliance 
since some 
banks started as 
family 
businesses. 
Yes to the extent of 
anti-money laundry. 
Banks should have 
anti-money laundry 
committee, anti-money 
laundry department, 
and compliance officer. 
 
Yes many circulars 
have been issued to 
first introduce the 
culture of CG and then 
to mandate it. 
However, the process 
is taking time because 
many family-owned 
“community” banks 
were reluctant to the 
concept of CG. 
Ministry doesn’t directly 
affect the banking sector as 
the BDL and BCC does; yet it 
indirectly influences it through 
the generic laws and rules it 
issues. 
Yes. Starting 2004 
BDL started to 
speak loud on CG 
and issued many 
circulars 
concerning this 
paradigm. 
Future of CG Bright future. 
Challenge to fight 
corruption. 
Bright future. Many 
Lebanese banks are 
increasingly being 
exposed to foreign 
markets and many 
markets require having 
a good CG in place in 
order to invest in them. 
Positive. Many modifications 
on the Lebanese code of 
Commerce are currently under 
discussion in the Lebanese 
parliament, which relate to the 
field of corporate governance. 
Bright future. Due 
to the increased 
international 
interest, CG has 
been witnessing 
increased 
awareness by the 
Lebanese banking 
sector. 
Panel B: CSR Paradigm 
 ABL SIC BCC 
Ministry of Economy and 
Trade 
BdL 
Understanding 
of CSR 
Vague, not well 
defined. In 
Lebanon it is a 
Façade. 
Benefiting the society. 
CSR brings banks 
closer to their 
community and hence 
people will have more 
“confidence” in banks. 
NA 
Benefiting the 
various 
stakeholders at 
different levels. 
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Is CSR 
important to 
stakeholders 
Yes Yes Yes NA Yes 
Motives for 
CSR 
Publicity, 
marketing. 
To maintain their 
business. 
Banks in Lebanon use 
CSR as a “marketing 
tool”. 
NA 
Marketing and PR 
tool for building a 
“socially 
responsible image”. 
Reaction to 
the possibility 
of mandating 
CSR 
No would not be 
CSR anymore. 
Farfetched. Already 
Problems with 
imposing corporate 
governance. 
No NA 
No master plan still 
concentrates on 
ensuring effective 
CG in Lebanese 
banks rather than 
mandating CSR 
investments. 
Relationship 
between CSR 
and Financial 
Performance 
Yes CSR gives 
benefits in terms 
of a good 
image. And 
good image is 
promotion. 
Yes if I was good to 
the community, the 
community will return 
it back. 
CSR investments affect 
the firm’s performance 
and firm’s performance 
also affects CSR 
investments. CSR 
investment may be 
costly at first but will 
reap benefits of 
enhanced financial 
performance later on 
by being closer to their 
clients and gain their 
confidence. 
NA 
Yes CSR 
investment may be 
costly at first but 
will reap benefits of 
enhanced financial 
performance later 
on. 
Future of CSR 
Progressing but 
some are still 
treating CSR as 
marketing. 
Moving forward. 
The road for effective 
CSR is still very long 
and banks should focus 
on having specific 
projects. 
NA 
CSR has been 
growing in a fast 
pace, however, it 
didn't reach the 
strategic level; 
banks in Lebanon 
are still at the 
philanthropic level 
of CSR. And BDL 
“did not reach the 
level of a full-
fledged CSR yet. 
Panel C: CG-CSR Nexus  
 ABL SIC BCC 
Ministry of Economy and 
Trade 
BdL 
Interrelated or 
two distinct 
concepts 
Interrelated Interrelated Interrelated NA Interrelated 
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Does effective 
CG affect 
CSR? How? 
Yes one of them 
will ease the 
way to the 
other. You can’t 
say you have 
CSR if you 
don’t have 
effective 
corporate 
governance. 
Obviously it would. 
The more the board 
gets to be aware of the 
positive results of CSR; 
the more they will tend 
to take the initiatives 
seriously. 
Yes effective CG that 
can lead to CSR 
investment. 
NA 
Yes effective CG 
will lead to CSR 
being strategic and 
well implemented. 
Is there a 
relationship 
between CG, 
CSR and firm 
performance? 
Yes Yes 
CG and CSR can have 
a synergy effect in 
enhancing firm’s 
performance in the 
long term, since bad 
CG can lead to big 
losses in banks and 
wrong CSR can also 
lead to a flawed image 
of the bank. 
NA 
Yes a good CG will 
initiate strategic 
CSR activities, 
which will lead to 
an enhanced 
financial 
performance in the 
long run. 
(1) CG as a 
pillar of CSR, 
(2) CSR as a 
dimension of 
CG, or (3) CG 
and CSR as 
part of a 
continuum 
(2) CSR as a 
dimension of 
CG. 
(2) CSR as a dimension 
of CG. 
(2) CSR as a dimension 
of CG since CG has the 
umbrella attribute. 
NA 
(2) CSR as 
dimension of CG 
Does firm 
performance 
affect CSR 
investment? 
Yes Yes NA NA NA 
Notes: The table provides a summary and comparative analysis of the responses of banking authorities to the survey 
along three dimensions: corporate governance, corporate social responsibility and the corporate governance-
corporate social responsibility nexus. 
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Table 6. Summary of Banks’ Responses 
Panel A: CG Paradigm 
Indicators/ 
Banks 
BLF SAL BLC SAL Audi SAL 
Fransabank 
SAL 
Blom Bank 
Core Values 
Integrity, 
Competences, 
Responsibility, 
Humanism, and 
Engagement 
Do what we 
say, 
integrity, 
performance 
driven, 
promote 
gender 
equality and 
responsible 
corporate 
citizens 
Sustainable 
growth, good 
financial 
standing and 
flexibility, 
sound Corporate 
Governance 
Integrity, 
Loyalty, 
Credibility, 
Accountability 
and 
Transparency 
Prudence, 
Professionalism, 
Integrity, 
Improvement, 
Performance and 
Stewardship 
Independent and 
Non-Executive 
Board Members 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BOD 
Committees 
Audit and Risk 
Audit 
Risk 
Executive 
CG 
Audit, 
Risk 
CG and 
Remuneration,  
Executive 
Audit,  
Risk, 
CG 
Audit,  
Risk, Consulting 
Strategy and CG, 
Nomination and 
Remuneration 
Adequate 
Disclosure 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Code of 
Conduct 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Compliant with 
BDL 
Requirements 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Future of CG 
Banking sector 
ahead of other 
sectors since it’s 
regulated. Family-
owned business 
and SME’s may 
be the most 
reluctant to 
change. 
Cultural 
aspect of 
CG,  
 might be 
difficult for 
all Lebanese 
firms 
including 
SME’s and 
family-
Owned 
Businesses 
to easily 
implement 
CG and 
adhere to its 
principles 
A bright future 
for further 
enhancements 
NA 
Still at the beginning 
and banks alone are 
not enough, Banks 
and companies need 
not only to comply 
with CG principles 
but to be convinced 
of doing so. Monitor 
CG. 
Panel B: CSR Paradigm 
Indicators/ 
Banks 
BLF SAL BLC SAL Audi SAL 
Fransabank 
SAL 
Blom Bank 
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Main CSR 
Values 
Employees, 
Clients, 
Environment and 
Community 
Business, 
People, 
Community 
and 
Environment 
Education, 
Humanitarian 
and Health, 
Social, 
Environment 
Economy, 
Social and 
Humanitarian, 
Education, 
Environment 
and Cultural 
Environment, 
Health,  
Safety, and 
Education. 
Main CSR 
Activities 
Development 
opportunities, 
trainings, internal 
communication, 
large local 
network, Internet 
Banking, charity, 
sponsorships, 
employee 
volunteerism, 
partnerships with 
NGOs, Green 
initiatives. 
Corporate 
Governance 
Code, 
trainings, 
green 
headquarter, 
green 
suppliers, we 
initiative, 
growth 
opportunities
, gender 
equality, UN 
Women 
Empowerme
nt Principles, 
green goals, 
partnerships 
with NGOs 
Developmental 
activities, 
partnerships 
with NGOs, 
sports activities, 
scholarship 
funding, gender 
equality, 
competitions, 
donations, 
sponsorships, 
Grow Green, 
employee clubs, 
part of the pilot 
program for ISO 
26000 
UN Global 
Compact, Micro 
Credits, 
partnerships 
with NGOs, 
mentoring 
school students, 
university loans, 
financial 
donations, 
sponsorships, 
Green 
initiatives, 
wildest branch 
network, 
trainings, skills 
enhancement 
seminars   
Blom Shabeb, 
Blom Demining, 
Blom Beirut 
Marathon, Blom 
Green Cycle, 
trainings, seminars 
and events for 
employees, and other 
initiatives like 
charity and 
sponsorships 
Motives for 
CSR 
The founders 
spirit and 
conscience to give 
back to the 
society 
Conviction 
of being part 
of the 
society, 
search for 
credibility 
Giving back to 
the community 
and caring for 
the 
environment, 
triple bottom 
line- people, 
planet, profits 
Promote 
effective public-
private 
partnerships and  
economic 
development, 
and enhance 
civil society’s 
aspirations 
Giving back to the 
community, Do good 
for yourself 
Benefits of CSR 
Enhanced image, 
increased 
awareness on 
social and 
environmental 
issues, motivated 
employees. 
Differentiati
on from 
competitors 
and 
enhanced 
image, 
however in 
this case it’s 
not about 
marketing 
Giving a true 
sense of 
responsibility to 
all stakeholders 
Reputation 
contributes to 
image building 
and good 
marketing and 
in the long term 
result in higher 
profits. 
enhanced image, 
Differentiation from 
competitors, 
enhanced employee 
productivity 
Management 
Support 
Receptive 
Initiative 
from the 
GM- CSR 
Committee 
Full Support 
Very engaged 
and full 
commitment 
Receptive 
Type of CSR 
Philanthropic, 
working on 
shifting to 
Strategic CSR. 
Reaching the 
strategic 
level 
Philanthropic, 
currently 
studying a more 
strategic CSR 
approach 
Reaching the 
strategic level 
Philanthropic in 
some activities and 
Strategic in others 
Formal CSR 
Program 
Yes- CSR Unit 
Yes- CSR 
Committee 
Yes- CSR Unit Yes- CSR Unit Not Yet 
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Relationship 
between CSR 
and Financial 
Performance 
Could be in the 
long run if 
Strategic CSR is 
in place 
Yes- through 
the business 
component 
of CSR, 
increased 
productivity 
of 
employees 
Not the driver 
for the bank’s 
CSR, too early 
to judge if a 
relationship 
exists between 
the two 
Certainly, CSR 
and financial 
performance are 
inter-related 
Could be in the long 
run if Strategic CSR 
is in place 
Future of CSR 
Increased 
awareness, 
however firms 
need to 
understand that 
CSR is more than 
charity and 
philanthropy, it’s 
about the way of 
doing business 
Promising in 
Lebanon 
More uptake by 
more 
organizations 
It is going to 
evolve more and 
more. 
Very promising in 
Lebanon 
Reaction to the 
possibility of 
mandating CSR 
Not encouraging, 
maybe give 
incentives to do 
so. 
Very 
positive- 
more banks 
would be 
benefiting 
the society 
and, once it 
becomes 
regulated, 
banks would 
start doing it 
right and not 
as a 
marketing 
tool. 
It would be 
ideal since this 
would 
encourage other 
banks to 
become socially 
responsible. 
Perhaps, even 
get a tax 
rebate… 
NA 
Not encouraging, if 
banks don’t 
willingly invest in 
CSR, CSR won’t be 
right. 
Panel C: CG-CSR Nexus 
Indicators/ 
Banks 
BLF SAL BLC SAL Audi SAL 
Fransabank 
SAL 
Blom Bank 
Interrelated or 
two distinct 
concepts 
Interrelated Interrelated Interrelated Interrelated Interrelated 
Type of 
relationship 
A solid CG is part 
of CSR, giving 
CSR the umbrella 
attribute 
CG as a part 
of CSR- 
giving CSR 
the umbrella 
attribute 
CSR completes 
corporate 
governance and 
its values. CG is 
a component in 
the main frame 
of CSR. 
NA 
CSR can be a part of 
CG, they 
complement each 
other, but CG comes 
first. 
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Does effective 
CG affect CSR? 
How? 
an effective CG 
can affect CSR, 
CG can cause 
CSR 
CG doesn't 
directly 
causes CSR 
however, 
effective CG 
can affect 
CSR 
The group’s 
governance has 
affected the 
bank’s 
interpretation of 
issues such as  
risk, ethics and 
conduct; and 
these, in turn 
have affected 
CSR. 
NA 
CG does not 
necessarily cause 
CSR neither CSR 
causes CG. 
Is there a 
relationship 
between CG, 
CSR and firm 
performance? 
Yes 
Yes- there 
can be a 
relation 
Probably NA Yes 
(1) CG as a 
pillar of CSR, 
(2) CSR as a 
dimension of 
CG, or (3) CG 
and CSR as part 
of a continuum 
CG as a pillar of 
CSR 
CG as a 
pillar of 
CSR 
CG as a pillar of 
CSR 
NA 
CG and CSR as part 
of a continuum 
Does firm 
performance 
affect CSR 
investment? 
Theoretically it 
shouldn't but  
practically it 
surely does 
Yes- but this 
is not and 
should not 
always be 
the case 
It probably does 
but each firm 
can be as 
responsible as it 
can 
NA 
Yes- in allocating 
CSR budget 
Does the 
availability of 
resources affect 
CSR 
investment? 
Can be a factor 
for CSR 
investments but 
not a direct one, 
conviction should 
be the base 
It can affect 
CSR but 
little things 
can also 
make a 
difference 
Certainly NA Certainly 
Notes: The table provides a summary and comparative analysis of the responses of banks to the survey along three 
dimensions: corporate governance, corporate social responsibility and the corporate governance-corporate social 
responsibility nexus. 
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Appendix A. Detailed Questionnaire Addressed to Lebanese Banks and to the Banking 
Authorities 
      Part I. Questions relating to the corporate governance paradigm 
1- Do you have a CG manual as mandated by BDL circular 106? 
2- What are the CG mechanisms employed by your institution? (Internal, External, 
Disclosure…) 
3- How is your board of directors formed? (Number? Number of independent directors?) 
4- How are you board committees formed? (Mainly Risk and Audit committees as mandated 
by BDL circulars) 
5- How important are CG and its mechanisms in your opinion? 
6- How do you see the future of CG in Lebanon? 
 
Part II. Questions relating to the corporate social responsibility paradigm 
7- Does your institution invest in CSR? If yes, what type of CSR (economic, legal, ethical, 
philanthropic or strategic?). 
8- Please describe the main CSR activities that your institution undertakes. 
9- What are your motives for engaging in CSR? 
10- Who are your most important stakeholders? 
11- How important is CSR in your opinion? What are the advantages of engaging in CSR 
activities? 
12- How are your shareholders and senior managers looking at CSR? 
13- How are other stakeholders valuing CSR? 
14- Does your institution see a relationship between CSR and financial Performance? 
15- How do you see the future of CSR in Lebanon? 
 
Part III. Questions relating to the corporate governance-corporate social responsibility 
nexus 
16- Do you see a relationship between CG and CSR? (Interrelated or two distinct concepts?) 
17- If yes, How? (CSR as an extension of CG or the inverse? Do you see a causal relationship 
between CG and CSR?) 
18- In your opinion, what CG mechanisms, if any, affect CSR? Does effective CG affect 
CSR? 
19- Do you think there is relationship between CG, CSR and firm performance? 
20- What would be your reaction if BDL issues a new circular mandating CSR investments 
and reporting in banks? 
21- What do you think about the suggested three models of the relation between CG and 
CSR: (1) CG as a pillar for CSR, (2) CSR as a dimension of CG, and (3) CG and CSR as 
part of a continuum? 
22- Do you believe that firm performance affects CSR investment? 
23- Do you think that the availability of resources (positive slack) affects CSR investment? 
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Questionnaire Addressed to Banking Authorities 
Part I. Questions relating to corporate governance  
1- How and why do you think the concept of CG is important? 
2- When, why and how Lebanese authorities incorporated this concept in its requirements 
and issues BDL circulars for it?  
3- How are Lebanese authorities following on the issues of CG in banks? 
4- How do you see the future of CG in Lebanon? 
 
Part II. Questions relating to corporate social responsibility 
5- How familiar are you with the notion of CSR and its types? (economic, legal, ethical, 
philanthropic and strategic) 
6- How important do you think this concept is to  
- Shareholders? 
- Other stakeholders? 
- The society? 
7- What do you think are the main CSR activities that banks should enroll in? 
8- In your opinion, what are the motives for investing in CSR? 
9- Do your see a relationship between CSR and Financial Performance in banks? 
10- How do you see the future of CSR in Lebanon? 
 
Part III. Questions related to the corporate governance – corporate social responsibility 
nexus 
11- Do you see a relationship between CG and CSR? (Interrelated or two distinct concepts?) 
12- If yes, How? (CSR as an extension of CG or the inverse? Do you see a causal relationship 
between CG and CSR?) 
13- In your opinion, what CG mechanisms, if any, affect CSR? Does effective CG affect 
CSR? 
14- Do you think there is relationship between CG, CSR and firm performance? 
15- Would you consider issuing new regulations mandating CSR investments and reporting 
in banks? 
16- What do you think about the suggested three models of the relation between CG and 
CSR: (1) CG as a pillar for CSR, (2) CSR as a dimension of CG, and (3) CG and CSR as 
part of a continuum? 
17- Do you believe that firm performance affects CSR investment? 
18- Do you think that the availability of resources (positive slack) affects CSR investment? 
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